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Abstract
We develop a game-theoretic framework to investigate the competitive implications of consumer-to-consumer
electronic marketplaces, which promote concurrent selling of new and used goods. In many e-marketplaces,
where suppliers cannot directly use second-hand goods for practicing inter-temporal price discrimination, the
threat of cannibalization of new goods by used goods become significant. We examine conditions under which
it is optimal for suppliers to operate in such markets, explaining why used-goods markets may not be predatory
for them. While a monopolist supplier is worse off in the presence of a secondary market, competition can  in
fact make it better off. The presence of used-goods markets provides an active outlet for some consumers to sell
their second-hand goods. Such sales lead to an increase in their disposable income. This increased income can
then be used to buy an additional new good. Contrary to conventional wisdom, our model predicts the reduction
in the price of new goods when there are used-goods markets. We highlight the strategic role that used goods
commission plays in determining optimal profits. Overall, for a wide range of parameters, there is an increase
in social welfare from establishing such secondary markets. 
Keywords:  Used goods resale, quality degradation, supplier competition, budget constraint, game theory,
electronic markets
Introduction
“Amazon’s Used-Book Sales Upset Authors” — New York Times, April 10, 2002 
“Guild Recommends De-Linking from Amazon” — The Author’s Guild, May 2002.
The recent attempts of some online retailers to sell used books using their  Consumer-to-consumer e-marketplace mechanisms
has elicited a considerable amount of attention. Judging from the headlines quoted above, it is clear that this practice of online
used book sales by both merchants and individuals has not gone done well with publishers. E-tailing giant Amazon.com is fuelling
the trend much to the dismay of publishers and suppliers of other goods. According to publishers, Amazon’s high-profile
dissemination of used copies eats into their often limited royalties and shortens how long they have to generate new-book sales.
This has prompted fears that publishers and suppliers will be forced to boost the prices of new products, in order to extract as high
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a price as they can during the one-time sale of their product. Amazon, however, welcomes the traffic that is generated and the
commissions it earns.  A recent Wall Street Journal article (July 22, 2002) reports that the roughly equivalent amount of raw profit
in each case is why Amazon says it doesn’t really care whether it sells a good from its warehouses or through independent
merchants. In fact, secondhand goods are proving to be a money-spinner for Amazon, and the e-commerce site is expanding its
policy of paying commissions to its affiliate Web sites to include the sale of used goods. No longer restricted to books, this
matchmaking has spread to CDs and even DVDs.
A salient feature of some of these products is that once bought, many consumers derive only a limited utility from keeping them
and are willing to resell them, if the transaction costs are negligible. The used good e-market provides access to those consumers
who cannot afford to buy the new goods while it offers current owners an outlet to dispose of  used goods which still have market
value and from which they have already derived their utility. Because of such concurrent selling of new and used goods on the
Internet, a fundamental issue here is the strong possibility that used goods can cannibalize the sales of new goods. Conventional
wisdom and prior research (Miller 1974) suggests that when suppliers do not draw any royalties from the used-good sales, the
opening of secondary markets will force them to increase the new-good prices in order to extract the maximum possible profit
from the onetime sale of a new good. In this paper, we attempt to provide some alternate rationale to show that new-good prices
need not increase in the presence of second-hand markets.
Research Question, Prior Literature, and Contribution
Does the sale of used goods hurt or benefit suppliers when they cannot accrue any direct profits from secondary market sales?
What is the impact of the quality of used goods on new-good prices, suppliers’ profits, and consumer surplus? How does the
strategic variable of used-good commission impact profits and prices? 
The nature of durable goods markets has long been an active research subject in economics. The difficulty of maintaining the
monopoly power on durable goods is due in part to the problem of time-inconsistency, first pointed out by Coase (1972).
However, after the early confirmations of the conjecture, other situations were described in which the Coase conjecture does not
hold, such as in Kahn (1986).  Rust (1986) solves for consumer behavior and prices for used goods in a durable-goods market,
with stochastic depreciation. Anderson and Ginsburgh (1994) study how adverse selection would affect the equilibrium in the
used-goods market.  Waldman (1997) shows how the monopolist could benefit from explicitly interfering with the used-goods
market, e.g., through imposing a variable transaction fee on buyers of used goods. Porter and Sattler (1999) introduce a transaction
cost for private sellers of used goods, although the manufacturer in their model does not incur a disposal cost. Huang et al. (2001)
highlight how  consumers also need to worry about time-consistency in their own decision making.
The success of used0goods e-marketplaces, such as that promoted by Amazon, motivates the need to go beyond the existing
models.  Constructing a comprehensive model that can simultaneously accommodate commonly observed phenomena such as
active secondary markets, heterogeneity in consumer preferences, endogenous demand functions, quality depreciation, and the
element of product substitutability is the focus of this paper. Before proceeding to discuss the model, we highlight three features
that distinguish our work from prior work and lead to our main contributions. 
The first feature which distinguishes our model is that we consider two different kind of goods, each being sold by a different
supplier, with an underlying heterogeneity in consumers’ purchasing affinity for the two goods. Hence the presence of used-goods
markets not only expands the demand for a good of a specific type but also opens up the possibility of some consumers purchasing
the second good of another type. This motivates suppliers to compete even more on prices. We show that it is this dual product
purchasing behavior of some consumers which plays a strategic role in boosting suppliers’ profits. Indeed, it is the existence of
the secondary market, which enables some consumers to indulge in resales which in turn leads to an increase in their disposable
income. This increased income can then be used to buy an additional new good.
Second, we begin with a general formulation of underlying utility and then endogenously derive the consumer demand functions,
which is different from prior literature where inverse demand functions have been used.  Third, in our model, suppliers do not
accrue any gains from used-good sales and hence they cannot directly use second-hand goods for practicing inter-temporal price
discrimination. All of the direct benefits of the secondary market are captured by the electronic retailer, which acts as an
intermediary in our model. This assumption fits well with several electronic marketplaces like those of books, CDs, and DVDs
set up by Amazon and E-Bay.  In general, it applies to the case of those goods where transaction frequency is much higher while
transaction amounts are relatively smaller.
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Model
The model consists of two suppliers, SA and SB, selling goods A and B respectively, through one common retailer, to a unit mass
of consumers. The product i (i g A,B)  that is marketed by each supplier is a durable that provides two periods of service.  The
good is new when it is marketed in period 1 and the same good is classified as used in period 2. In period 1, only new goods are
available. In period 2, the retailer opens a used-goods market where consumers can buy and sell used goods with minimal
transaction costs set to zero without loss of generality. The retailer sells both the goods, A and B, supplied by each of the
respective suppliers. Whenever a consumer sells the used good, the retailer gets a commission ku  per used good sold while the
remaining (1- ku) goes to the consumer. Similarly it gets kN  per new good sold, with (1- kN ) going to the supplier. Without loss
of generality, we also assume that the marginal cost of each good for the suppliers is symmetric and set to zero. 
Consumers are modeled as utility maximizers. Let 2  be a consumer’s valuation for a good, where 2 in [ 0,1]. The type parameter
theta  indicates the heterogeneity in a consumer’s marginal valuation for quality. For any given quality, a consumer with a higher
theta  is willing to pay more for the product than one with a lower 2. This type of consumer heterogeneity has been widely
employed in marketing and economics literature (Moorthy 1988). Let 1 denote the quality of the  new good and q denote the
quality of used good in period 2, where 0 < q < 1. Thus q can be interpreted as the degree of inter-temporal quality degradation
of the new good over two periods. If a consumer purchases a product of quality q at price p, his utility is U (2) = 2q-p. 
In our model, there are two types of consumers. Type A consumers have 2  valuation for good A and "2 evaluation for good B
where " g [0,1]. Similarly, type B consumers have 2 valuation for good B and "2  valuation for good A.  "  is the degree of
consumers’ affinity for the other product such that the higher the value of " the more intense is the competition between the two
suppliers for inducing consumers to buy their goods. When " = 0, consumers strictly prefer the specific good i in (A,B) according
to their respective types, i g (A,B).  However, when " > 0, consumers would have an incentive to buy both goods as long as it
gives them a positive surplus. We also impose an implicit budget constraint BC for the consumers in the form of disposable
income for goods. Having bought a new good in period 1, consumers can either hold on to a used good or sell it in the marketplace
in the second period. Intuitively, we would expect that for the same used good, a consumer holding the good will derive less utility
than a used-good buyer.  Therefore, we assume that while the buyer of a used good derives a utility of q from consuming the good,
the holder of the used good derives a utility of h, where  h < q.  To motivate this discussion, consider a good such as a DVD or
a fiction novel. Once a consumer has seen the movie or read the novel, her utility from the content per se of the product might
reduce considerably. As such, she will derive a reduced utility from holding the good. Conversely, a buyer of the same used DVD
or novel can derive a much higher utility from the content of the good.
The game is modeled as a multistage process across two periods. We consider a subgame perfect equilibrium of this game using
backward induction. First, suppliers choose optimal new-good prices simultaneously. Then two events occur simultaneously.
Market forces determine the optimal price of used goods from clearance conditions. At the same time, consumers choose a
combination of strategies to maximize their surplus over two periods and demand is realized. 
No Secondary E-Marketplace
We begin with modeling the case when used goods are absent.  Note that we have a duopoly market structure.  Therefore, both
suppliers can compete in prices to induce some consumers in each of their respective markets to buy both goods. We proceed to
show that this game has two equilibria: a standard noncompetitive monopoly equilibrium in which only one good is sold and a
competitive equilibrium such that there exists a segment of consumers in each supplier’s market who buy both new goods, despite
the absence of a used-goods market.
Noncompetitive Equilibrium 
Since there is no `used-goods market, consumers buy the good in the first period and hold it in the second period.  Let’s denote
the price of the new good in the absence of a used-goods market as pn. This ensures that when the supplier sells their goods at
monopoly prices, buyers have enough income to buy it. From the incentive compatibility (IC) and individual rationality (IR)
constraints, consumers of both types in both markets, buy a good as long as  2 (1+h) - PN > 0 . Hence the demand for a new good
Ghose et al./Durable Goods Competition
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Proposition 1:  For all " g (0,0.61), there exists a symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium such that both suppliers offer the
monopoly price (P*N , P*N). In this equilibrium, consumers buy only one good.
In the case of new goods, the profit maximizing price for the retailer and suppliers is the same. In the case of used goods, as we
show later, strategies for the retailer and suppliers change because while the retailer still gets a commission for each used good
sold, the suppliers do not. It is this differential incentive for used-good sales between suppliers and retailers and the consequent
implications for equilibrium profits that we explore in this paper.
Competitive Equilibrium
In the previous equilibrium, we showed that both suppliers simultaneously offer monopoly prices and consumers only buy one
good.  Suppose both suppliers decide to deviate from their monopoly prices pmn and get some of the type i (j) users to buy good
j (i) and vice versa.  Suppose SA (SB) offers price PAlow (PBlow) < PN  such that in type B (A) market, some consumers find it
incentive-compatible to buy both goods A and B at lower prices as long as it satisfies their individual rationality (IR) constraint.
Hence the type B (A) market gets split into two segments, such that the higher willingness-to-pay consumers buy their preferred
good B (A) and good A (B) while the remaining buyers buy only good B (A). As is immediate, all type B consumers between
1 and thh also buy from SA. This situation is depicted in the Figure 1
Figure 1.  Market Segmentation in Accordance with Consumer Buying Strategies




















We proceed to show that this budget constraint is significantly lowered due to the establishment of secondary electronic markets
and, in the long term, it is this feature that will lead to an increase in supplier profits in the presence of used-goods markets.
Retailer Establishes a Secondary E-Marketplace
One major goal of this paper is to show that, for a finite budget constraint, users can buy only one good in the absence of a used-
goods market.  But in the presence of a used-goods market, for the same budget constraint, some users can buy both goods.
Further, when transaction costs are low, as on the Internet, the budget constraint for which this behavior holds will be milder than
when there are significant transaction costs, as in the offline world. To illustrate briefly with an example to motivate the discussion
so far, suppose a consumer has a disposable income of  $100 for buying books and that the prices of two books that he desires
Ghose et al./Durable Goods Competition
2003 — Twenty-Fourth International Conference on Information Systems 345
NHNSIUII
0 θ3 θ2 θ1
1
to buy are $65 each.  Given his existing income, on his own he is unable to buy them both. However if he buys one book and then
is able to resell it for $30, his total budget in the second period is $65.  Thus the used-goods market increases his disposable
income, enabling him to buy the second book as well.
Figure 2.  Transaction Mechanism with Secondary Electronic Market
At the beginning of each period, when consumers evaluate their needs over the two-period horizon, they can follow one of the
five independent strategies laid out below. Let  Ni, H, S, U and I denote a single period action, corresponding to buying a new
good of type i, holding onto a used good, selling a used good, buying a used good, and remaining inactive by not buying any good.
Monopoly Revisited
In the absence of competition, that is, when " = 0, consumers always buy their preferred good according to the type of the market
to which they belong.  That is, consumers of type A(B) buy only good A(B). The figure below describes the segmentation of the
market based on the consumer action strategies. Let PN and PS denote the new good and used good prices, respectively. Hence
the corresponding utilities derived from various action strategies are as follows:
1. (NH) Buy new good in period 1 and hold onto it in period 2:  2 (1+h) – PN
2. (NS) Buy new good in period 1 and sell it in period 2:  2 – PN +(1 – ku ) PS 
3. (IU) Remain inactive in period 1 and buy used good in period 2:  2 – PS 
4. (II) Remain inactive in both periods:  0
By equating the IR and IC constraints based on these four strategies, we derive the three indifferent points 21 , 22 , and 23, which
define the consumer market segments. It is important to recognize that in our model, based on suppliers’ pricing strategies, the
number of consumers in these groups will emerge endogenously. Since the used-goods market is competitive, the price of used
goods, PS will also be endogenously determined. This ensures that clearance conditions will equalize demand and supply of used
goods at all times. By equating the demand of used goods with the supply of used goods, we get the market clearing second period
price. Hence the supplier’s profit equation is given by
BS = (1– 21  + 21 – 22)(1 – kN)PN
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Proposition2:  The suppliers’ profits decrease with the establishment of a used-goods market while the retailer’s profits
increases.
The presence of an active used-goods market creates competition for new goods because the option of buying used goods is now
incentive compatible for some consumers who would have bought new goods before. This enhanced competition forces suppliers
to decrease the new-good prices in order to remain competitive with used goods. Recall that the supplier cannot derive any benefit
from the sale of used goods, since all proceeds from the sale of used goods (i.e., the commission fees) are shared between the
retailer and the consumers. The price of new goods pn decreases from the case when there is no used-goods market. With market
share remaining unchanged, this leads to lower profits for the supplier.  On the other hand, if we were to compare the profits of
the retailer, we observe that the retailer’s profits increase by opening up of the secondary electronic market. The loss from the
reduced profits from the NH and NS segments is more than offset by the gain from used-good sales in the IU segment.  Therefore,
is it immediately clear that Amazon always has had an incentive to establish a used-goods market because it is always better off.
Interestingly, we observe that, for a monopoly supplier, the quality of used goods does not influence the number of new goods
sold.  This is because the implicit quality degradation cost  borne by consumers is proportional to the valuation of the consumers
for the original good, theta, and hence the new good price  adjusts endogenously. This leads consumers to self-select in such a
way that, although the supplier loses some new-good sales in the NH segment, it makes up for those lost sales in the NS segment
and thus the total segment of new good buyers remains at one-half. 
Proposition 3:  (1) The optimal new-good price and supplier profits always decrease with used-good quality q but increase with
used-good holding utility h.  (1) The optimal used-good price increases monotonically with both the used-good attributes, q
and h.  (3) The optimal new-good and used-good price increases monotonically with an increase in the used-good commission,
ku .  (4) The establishment of a secondary used-good marketplace leads to an increase in consumer surplus.  (5) Supplier profits
decrease with used-good commission ku.
When the used-good price increases due to an increase in quality q, then the supplier’s best response is to decrease pn to compete
head-to-head with used goods.  But when the used-good price increases due to supply considerations like changes in ku or h, then
the supplier’s best response is to increase PN. Our model suggests that suppliers gain if consumers derive a higher value from
holding the new good. The intuition behind this is that, with an epsilon change in h, although there is no change in the total
number of new goods sold (NH+NS), there is a reallocation of consumers between the NH and NS segments. Since the utility
of the NH segment increases with h, the supply of used goods decreases due to the larger NH and smaller NS segment. Since the
demand of used goods does not change, the reduced supply of used goods leads to an upward thrust on the used good prices which
in turn causes the new good price to increase as well. The increase in prices, with an unchanged total new good demand, results
in an increase in supplier’s overall profits with increasing h.
We show that ex post consumer welfare increases with the establishment of used-goods e-markets since there is a new segment
of used-good buyers who are a pure addition to the total number of existing new-good buyers.  These consumers could not afford
to buy new goods earlier but are now able to at least afford used goods.  Additionally, new-good buyers gain from reduced new-
good prices and this increases their surplus.
As ku  increases, consumers get less utility from selling the used good, compared to holding it. Hence the NH segment increases
in size while the NS segment shrinks in size. While the supply of used goods shrinks, the demand remains unchanged. This causes
the used-good price to increase, with ku. However with an increase in PS , PN  also increases, which puts a downward thrust on
demand for new goods. Consequently this leads to a decrease in supplier profits with increasing ku.
Duopoly:  Inter-Supplier Competition
Will the suppliers gain or lose if the captive consumers in their own markets also desire to buy the goods of the other
supplier—that is, from their competitors?  In this section, we proceed to answer this question by introducing the element of
competition. Since " > 0 now, there will always be some consumers who will buy one good each from both the suppliers, as long
as it gives them a positive surplus. This leads to the creation of a new segment which we term as NSN. The dominant consumer
strategies and corresponding utilities are as shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3.  Consumption Classes by Consumer Type 2 in Market i, i g (A, B)
Proposition 4:  Consumers in (1, 21) will follow NiSNj , consumers in (21 , 2q2) will follow Ni H, consumers in (22, 23) will follow
IUi, and those in (23,0) will follow II.
All consumers from 1  to 21 create the supply S of used goods. All consumers from (22 , 23) create the demand D for used goods.
Therefore, by equating D and S, we get the market clearing used-good price PS *. The optimal new-good price PN * can be derived
from the supplier’s profit equation, after substituting for PS*.  Note that the new-good sales occur first in two segments, that is,
in the NSN and NH segments. Also since the NSN segment in both the consumer markets, i and j, buys from both the respective
suppliers, each supplier gets twice the NSN  segment of the market.  Hence, the supplier’s profit equation is B (S) = 2 (1 – 21)(1
– kN ) PN  + (21 – 22)(1 – kN) PN
Whether monopoly or competition benefits suppliers is determined by ". There exists a critical value of "c  such that compared
to the monopoly regime, supplier profits increase with the introduction of inter-supplier competition for any " > "c. Thus for any
" which exceeds the critical value, suppliers make higher profits despite having to implicitly compete with each other. The NSN
segment thus plays a critical role in this scenario.  The existence of this segment leads to two countervailing effects for the
suppliers.  In order to incentivise consumers in the other market, j, to buy their less preferred good, supplier i will need to lower
its price. This causes profits to fall. However, it is precisely this reduction in price that leads to  additional sales from the NSN
segment of supplier j, since these consumers can afford to buy both the goods. This is the market expansion effect, which puts
an upward thrust on the profits.  These two countervailing forces lead to a situation wherein, depending on the value of ",
suppliers end up making higher profits than in the monopoly case.
Proposition 5:  The supplier’s optimal new-good price PN* in the presence of a competitive used-goods market is lower than
the optimal new-good price PN in the absence of an used-goods market. 
Counterintuitively, we find the used-goods marketplace actually leads to a decrease in the price of new goods. One would
conjecture that suppliers would increase the new good prices so as to extract the maximum consumer surplus from the first period
sale. The intuition underlying this follows from two effects. The first is that since used goods and new goods compete with each
other, the supplier has an incentive to discount new goods more sharply, to strengthen their sales and compete effectively with
used goods in period 2. We call this the inter-temporal price competition effect.  In addition to this direct effect, the existence of
consumers’ affinity for the second good also induces suppliers to price their new good lower than the monopoly price, so as to
gain the additional sales in the other supplier’s market. This is the market expansion effect described earlier. These two effects
act in sync with each other and bring down the new-good prices.
Proposition 6:  If consumers have an implicit budget constraint BC such that, 2 PN* – (1– ku ) PS < BC <  2 PN*, then suppliers’
profits increase with the establishment of a used-goods market, compared to the no-used-goods market scenario.
The intuition for this is that offering a market for used goods provides some consumers an incentive to sell their good. This
increases their disposable income, thereby allowing them to buy an additional new good. In particular, the NSN segment is now
able to buy the second (less preferred) good from the other supplier as well. This behavior is reinforced by the fact that due to
the two effects outlined earlier, the price of the new good also decreases in comparison to the scenario in which the used-goods
market was absent, thereby enabling a larger mass of consumers to buy new goods.
Thus, the important economic effect of the consumer-to-consumer electronic exchanges is that it creates a segment of consumers,
NSN, which is able to buy the second new good by virtue of the extra income through sales of their used good.  In effect the used-
good option is like a rebate coupon which reduces the net price that consumers actually pay for the new good. That is, the selling
price of the new good PN in period 2 effectively becomes equal to the sum of the new-good price in period 1 minus the expected
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used-good price in period 2.  This intuition is corroborated by the fact that as the used-goods commission charged by the retailer
ku decreases, supplier profits increase because consumers in the NSN segment then have a higher disposable income, enabling
them to buy both the new goods.
Proposition 7:  (1) For low values of q, the new-good price PN decreases with the used-good commission kc while for high
values of q it increases with kU.  (2) The new-good price PN* always increases monotonically with ", consumers’ degree of
preference for the second good. 
In contrast to the monopoly regime, the used-good commission plays a strategic role.  On one hand, increasing ku leads to higher
profits for the retailer since it then usurps a higher percentage of used-goods profits.  However, a higher ku also implies a lower
income for consumers in the NSN segment, which in turn adversely affects the sales of the second new good. For a broad range
of parameter values, we find that ku  has an adverse effect on the new-good price. As ku  increases, consumers will get a reduced
benefit from selling the used good, compared to holding it. Hence the NH segment increases in size while the NSN segment
shrinks in size. The reduced supply of used goods imparts an upward thrust to the used good price and consequently the new-good
prices.  Further, the incremental demand from the new-goods segment (NH-NSN) also has a price increasing effect.  However,
this effect is also offset by a downward thrust from the suppliers on new-good prices in order to expand the NSN segment.  In
order to induce more people in the other market j to buy the second new good, the supplier i decreases its new good price, PN. This
market expansion effect is stronger than the former inter-temporal price competition effect, leading to an overall decrease in prices
and increase in new-good sales.
Figure 4 shows the prices and the budget constraint, BCN, in the absence of used-goods markets.  Figure 5 shows how the BC is
lowered (BCU < BCN) due to the presence of used-goods markets.  The NSN segment thus plays a critical role in this scenario.
The existence of this segment leads to two countervailing effects for the suppliers.  In order to incentivise consumers in the other
market, j, to buy their less preferred good, supplier i will need to lower its price, PN*.  Further, by selling the good in the second
period, the NSN segment gets an additional income of (1- ku ) PS.
Both of these effects cause the budget constraint to decrease from BCN to BCU.  This reduction in BCU leads to additional sales
from the NSN segment of supplier j, since these consumers end up buying both the goods.  This is the market expansion effect,
which puts an upward thrust on the profits.  Thus by reducing the required BC, suppliers end up making higher profits than in
the no-used-goods market case.
 
Figure 4.  No Secondary e-Market Figure 5.  Mono and Duopoly with Secondary e-Market
Observation 1:  (1) There exists a critical value of "dm such that, compared to the monopoly regime, supplier profits increase with
the introduction of inter-supplier competition, for any " > "dm .  (2) Consumer surplus increases with inter-supplier competition
in secondary e-markets.
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Whether, monopoly or competition benefits suppliers, is determined by ".  Figure 6 shows that for " g (0.35,1) and  " g (0.35,1)
and  ku = 0.1, h = 0.1, suppliers are better off despite the implicit duopolistic competition.  It is quite intuitive to see why consumer
surplus (CS) increases when there is inter-supplier competition in the presence of used-goods markets.  The first effect is due to
the lowering of the new-good prices.  Further, there is an expansion in the demand for new goods.  Additionally some consumers
who were shut out of the market for new goods are also able to afford to buy used goods.  Since suppliers profits also increase
for any " > "dm , total welfare increases with the establishment of secondary electronic markets.  For any value of (ku , h)  and for
all " in (0.1,0.8) and for all q in (0.1,0.8) we observe that when suppliers are competing with each other in the concurrent selling
of new and used goods, the consumer surplus is higher than the case without used goods as shown in Figure 7.
Figure 6.  Difference in Consumer Surplus Figure 7.  Difference in Profits with Used
Goods (Duo-Mono)
Observation 2.  For " in (0.0.35), supplier’s profits increase with increase in used-good quality q, for all q in (0.0.5).  As alpha
increases beyond this range, suppliers’ profits decrease with q. 
Intuitively, as alpha increases, suppliers can afford to charge them higher prices. At low values of q, the supplier perceives less
of a threat from used goods and so he can increase the new-good price as alpha increases. The market expansion effect dominates
here.  However as q increases, the used-good prices also increase, which in turn leads to lower new-good prices to enable the new
good to compete head to head with used goods.  This is the inter-temporal price competition effect.  At high levels of q, this effect
is stronger than the market-expansion effect, leading to reduced profits.  Observation 2 has an interesting implication.  Since used-
good quality is an exogenous parameter for retailers or suppliers, it cannot be chosen endogenously by them. Our paper highlights
that used goods may not always be detrimental for suppliers.
Conclusion and Implications
Information technology facilitates the delivery of many products and services over newly emerging secondary electronic networks.
As these electronic networks develop and mature, it will be important to quantify their impact on supplier and retailer profits and
consumer welfare.  There has been a lot of strife between suppliers and retailers in the recent past over the damage which such
secondary electronic markets are supposedly causing to the profits of suppliers. The general consensus is that since used-good
sales cannibalize new-good sales, secondary e-markets established by brokers like Amazon and E-bay are necessarily a bane for
suppliers. Using a game-theoretic model, we investigate the competitive implications of these newly emerging e-marketplaces
on consumer surplus, suppliers’ prices, and profits. The purpose of our work is to highlight some of the important economic
properties of secondary consumer-to-consumer e-marketplaces which are cropping up on the Internet and causing a furor among
suppliers in industries such as book publishing and music.  The insights from this model help to explain several interesting market
phenomena including (1) the profitability of concurrent sales of new and used goods, i.e., why used-goods markets may not be
detrimental for suppliers, (2) the reduction in the price of new goods when there are used-goods markets, (3) the significant effect
of used goods commission fees on equilibrium prices and profits, (4) why an increase in the used goods quality may not
necessarily be a cannibalization threat for new goods, and (5) the overall increase in social welfare that accrues from establishing
such secondary electronic markets.
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We show that the major motivation of the retailer to establish a used-goods market is to capture additional surplus from those
consumers who were shut out of the new-goods market.  This enables it to effectively practice price discrimination.  Our model
also highlights that, compared to a monopolistic market, inter-supplier competition can be beneficial to suppliers in the presence
of a secondary market, rather than being harmful.  This occurs because the presence of used goods subdues the rate at which
suppliers can increase the new-good prices with consumers’ cross-product purchase affinity.  This then expands the market in
such a way that the market-expansion effect compensates for the price-competition effect.  Thus, we show that, contrary to popular
perceptions, the presence of a used-goods market is beneficial for suppliers too, under a relatively wide range of conditions.  When
advertized as a deep discount option for a new good, secondary electronic markets offer an extremely attractive option to increase
disposable income and thereby stimulate more new-goods sales. 
Our analysis has implications for durable goods in which suppliers sell through intermediaries but cannot accrue any direct gains
from secondary markets. As long as there is more than one supplier, and consumers are willing to buy another new good, a
secondary market can be useful for suppliers. Another implication from our model is that while deriving their optimal pricing
strategies, suppliers need to keep in mind the impact of a positive holding utility that some consumers derive from used goods.
Ignoring this aspect of consumer behavior will drive up the price beyond the optimal value. This implication also holds good for
a retailer while deriving its optimal used-good commission. 
In light of the ruckus created by publishers over Amazon’s practice of using their marketplace mechanism to sell used goods and
a call for government intervention in such markets, this result can have some public policy and managerial implications. Based
on the result that total welfare increases, our model suggests the strong possibility of a win-win situation for suppliers, retailers,
and consumers alike from the establishment of used-goods marketplaces. 
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose SA (selling book A) decides to deviate from its monopoly price PN and offers price P1 < PN. Then in its own market A,






compatible to buy their less preferred good A at a lower price as long as it satisfies their (IR) constraint.  Therefore, we have 2qB
(1 + h) – PN > "2B (1 + h) – P1  and "2B (1 + h) – P1 >0.  Hence demand D1B for good A from type B users at P1 is = 2B  – 2A =
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Optimizing the profit equation after substituting the monopoly price PN gives us the optimal price P1*.  Substituting P1* in, we






solving for positive values of " provides the critical value of " = 0.61 beyond which SA finds it profitable to offer P1*.
Proof of Proposition 2
(1)  Comparing the profits of the suppliers with and without used-goods markets, we find that profits in the absence of used-goods
markets BS (PN ) will be higher than that with used-goods markets BS (PN {"*}, PS {"*}) iff  >  (1 + h – kU) > 0 which is true.
(2)  Comparing the profits of the retailer with and without used-goods markets, we find that profits in the absence of used-goods
markets BR (PN ) will be higher than that with used-goods markets BR (\PN {"*}, PS {"*}) iff  (1 + h – q) > 0 which is true.
Proof of Proposition 3






































Comparing with the no-used-goods market supplier profit with consumers buying only one good, the difference in retailer’s profits
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Proof of Proposition 4
Apart from the four strategies stated in the proposition, consumers could adopt any of the two following strategies:  NSU and IN.
We shall now proceed to eliminate these two strategies.
(1) Utility from following an NSU strategy  UNSU = 2(1 + " h) – PN -PS + (1- kU )PS 
(2) Utility from following an IN strategy  UIN = 2(1 + h) – PN
Comparing NH and NSU, we find that UNH – UNSU = 2 (h – " h) + kU PS > 0.  Hence NSU < NH is proved. Also utility from IN
= 2 (1 + h) – PN, which is the same as that from NH.  This leads to the five possible strategies as stated in the proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 5
Compare the new book price in the presence of a used-goods market given by, with that in the absence of a used-goods market





















(0,1) the equilibrium exhibits the following property   We know that 1 + h – q > 0 and since 21 > 0 this.10 321 <<<< θθθ
implies that " + "h – h > 0.  Hence the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 6
From the demand supply clearance condition for used goods, we get PS (PN).  Plugging this back in the equation and maximizing
it w.r.t. price PN, we get  PN {"*}.  This in turn gives us PS {"*}.  Taking the second derivative of the supplier’s profit equation,
















the equation < 0.  This proves that PN {"*} is a maxima and hence BCU < BCN.
Proof of Proposition 7


































for lower values of q and  > 0 for higher values of q.
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